There is growing evidence that low-quality customer service prevails in the mobile telecommunications industry. In this paper we provide theoretical support to this empirical observation by using simple game theoretical models where inefficient low-quality service levels are part of an equilibrium strategy for the firms. We also find that the inefficiency is due to a demand-side market failure generated by incomplete information, and that it does not necessarily vanish with competition or with repeated interaction. This is particularly important in terms of policy implications because it suggests that the inefficiency should be solved through regulation via consumer protection.
Introduction
This work is part of an ongoing research project on consumer protection in mobile telecommunications. The main purpose of the project is to analyze if individual consumers of mobile telecommunications are subject to abuses by mobile operators, if these abuses might possibly arise due to market failures, and how improved regulation can increase overall welfare. In this paper we focus on a common situation, namely providing low-quality customer service, which seems to be spread among mobile operators worldwide (Sappington 2005 , El País 2012 , El Espectador 2012 .
We rationalize this outcome by using simple game-theoretic models where low quality is obtained in equilibrium. We also show that the low-quality equilibrium is ine¢ cient (i.e. overall welfare would improve by providing higher quality) and that the ine¢ ciency may not be solved through repeated interaction or competition. This result is important in terms of policy implications because it suggests that competition may not solve the ine¢ ciency and therefore justi…es regulation via consumer protection (see Smith 2000 , Cherry 2010 ).
Our basic model involves the following two-stage game: In the …rst stage, the …rms (mobile operators) providing the good (phone contract) simultaneously choose a price-quality pair. The price refers to the whole mobile phone service while the quality refers solely to the post-sale customer service associated to the phone contract (which is unobservable for the consumer upon purchase)
1 . In the second stage, a single (representative) consumer makes his purchase decision after observing all the prices, but remains ignorant about the qualities of the services (which are only revealed at the end of the second stage). The consumer prefers higher quality over lower quality, but the former is more costly to …rms than the latter. We consider variations of the model according to the number of participating …rms (one, two, several) and whether the game is played just once (one-shot) or several times (…nitely and in…nitely repeated).
The crux of the problem is incomplete information: mobile phone contracts are what are known as experience goods (Nelson 1970) , that is, goods that possess some features that are not observable by the consumer upon purchase and that can only be learned through experience. Costumer service in mobile telephony is such a feature: the mobile operator knows exactly the quality it provides but it is impossible for the consumer to observe its quality before actually using it, therefore the consumer has incomplete information about the service.
Although our work is motivated by empirical evidence in the mobile telecommunications industry, it applies to the general setting of an experience good with an unobservable quality and is thus related to the literature on vertical di¤erentiation, adverse selection, and signaling games and reputation.
In their vertical di¤erentiation models, Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Motta (1993) …nd that under complete information (i.e. when quality is observable for the consumer) …rms choose to di¤erentiate their products in order to relax price competition. This no longer holds under incomplete information: in our model we …nd equilibria where both …rms choose the same low quality (i.e. no di¤erentiation), although they may or may not relax price competition. In a similar vein to ours, Bester (1998) …nds that when allowing for vertical as well as horizontal di¤erentiation, incomplete information drives …rms to no di¤erentiation (i.e. they choose the same quality and locate at the same place) although he focuses on high-quality equilibria.
Our low-quality equilibria bear a resemblance to the "lemons"problem found by Akerlof (1970) in his adverse selection model for the used-car market, where only the bad cars (lemons) are traded. Despite this resemblance, the major di¤erence is that in our model, quality is an endogenous variable (…rms choose between high and low quality), while in his model it is exogenous (a used car owner either has a lemon or not).
Repeated purchases play an important role because they may allow for …rms to signal their quality and build a reputation. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) show that when quality is exogenous, …rms may use prices to signal their true quality and support separating equilibria (i.e. coexistence of di¤erent quality levels). In our model, separating equilibria are not possible, because when quality is endogenous, …rms are driven to choose the same quality level. For …nitely repeated purchases we show that the unique equilibrium outcome implies the low-quality choice (i.e. there is no possibility of building a reputation). However, with an in…nite horizon there is equilibrium multiplicity: although the low-quality choice by all …rms continues to be an equilibrium, we also show that there are price-signaling equilibria that support the high-quality choice (i.e. …rms are able to build a reputation). This result goes along the same line of thought as the quality premium and reputation models by Shapiro (1983) and Klein and Le-er (1981) . Nevertheless, the quality level obtained in equilibrium relies heavily on the consumers' expectations, and in particular we show that under pessimistic beliefs only the low-quality level may prevail.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present our benchmark monopoly model which is a generalization of Tirole (1988, pg. 96) . In section 3 we analyze the duopoly case which also leads to an ine¢ cient equilibrium outcome. In section 4 we show that the low-quality equilibrium continues to hold for a large number of …rms. Section 5 o¤ers concluding remarks. Proofs and examples are in the Appendix.
The Model (Monopoly)
We will consider a single representative consumer with utility function
q p if buying quality q at price p 0 otherwise where p is the price of the good, q is the quality level, and is a taste parameter re ‡ecting how much the individual values quality. This corresponds to the standard utility function used in models of vertical di¤erentiation (i.e. when goods may di¤er only in their quality). For simplicity we assume that q can take only two values: h ("high") or l ("low"), with h > l 0. In Tirole's model these levels take the particular values h = 1 and l = 0. As we will show later on, when l > 0, our generalization allows for equilibria that are not possible in that model.
There is only one …rm producing the good and the per-unit cost of providing the qualities are, respectively, c h > c l > 0 (i.e. high quality has a higher cost). We assume that there are no …xed costs and therefore the per-unit pro…t of the …rm is given by
p c q if selling quality q at price p 0 if not selling Note that the social surplus of producing quality q is
q c q if trading takes place 0 otherwise Therefore, the high quality level is socially e¢ cient whenever h c h > max f0; l c l g. For our speci…c case of mobile telecommunications, it seems very natural to assume that providing the high-quality service is socially better than providing low-quality service which in turn dominates not providing the service at all. Therefore we will assume
It is worth noticing that this assumption does not hold under Tirole's model since when l = 0 no production dominates providing low-quality service.
The time structure of the game is as follows: In the …rst stage the …rm (player 1) chooses a price-quality pair (p; q). In the second stage, having observed p but ignoring q, the consumer (player 2) decides whether to buy or not. Let G be this one-shot game and denote by G T ( ), the game G repeated during T periods with common discount factor . We turn now to study the equilibria of these games.
One-Shot Game
Notice that since player 2 doesn't know the level q when she decides her action and since player 1 doesn't know player 2's action when deciding the quality level q, the induced game is strategically equivalent to a game where player 1 chooses the price p in the …rst stage and in the second stage there is a simultaneous game where player 1 chooses quality q and player 2 chooses whether to buy or not, as illustrated in the following …gure
[FIGURE 1 GOES HERE]
Assumption: we will make the standard assumption that the consumer buys whenever indi¤erent.
Solving the game backwards we obtain a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SP N E): for any p chosen in the …rst stage, the second stage game in strategic form is
Notice that player 1 will play l because it is a dominant strategy. By eliminating strategy h from game (1) we observe that player 2 chooses to buy as long as l p 0 (2) (the assumption allows for the inequality not being strict). Knowing this, in the …rst stage the …rm will choose the highest price p for which (2) holds, i.e. p = l Therefore, in the unique SP N E the …rm chooses quality l and the payo¤s are
The result is ine¢ cient since by assumption h c h > l c l = U + .
The SP N E is characterized by the strategy pro…le s = (s 1 ; s 2 ), where
Finitely Repeated Interaction
Let's consider now game G T ( ) with …nite T . Since the stage game G has a unique SP N E; solving by backward induction we obtain a unique SP N E for G T ( ) which consists of playing s unconditionally at each period. Therefore the …rm chooses the low quality in every period and per-period payo¤s are the ones corresponding to the one-shot game. Thus, we have shown that under a …nite horizon and a single …rm the ine¢ cient low-quality outcome is not only an equilibrium but it is in fact the unique equilibrium.
In…nitely Repeated Interaction
Let's focus now on game G 1 ( ). Once again, playing unconditionally in every period the strategy pro…le s constitutes a SP N E of game G 1 ( ) for any value of . However this is no longer the unique SP N E of the repeated game. In fact there are in…nitely many equilibria: applying the "Folk" theorems (see Fudenberg and Tirole 1991) it is possible to …nd a SP N E supporting at each period any outcome yielding feasible per-period payo¤s for both players higher than those of s , provided is su¢ ciently large (i.e. players are su¢ ciently patient). In the appendix we illustrate this result by constructing multiple SP N E of G 1 ( ) where in all of them the high quality is provided at each period. (they di¤er on how the social surplus is distributed between the …rm and the consumer and in the minimum value of the discount factor that supports them).
We have thus shown that for the monopoly case and under the three scenarios (one-shot, …nitely repeated and in…nitely repeated) there exists an ine¢ cient equilibrium where the low quality is produced. In the …rst two scenarios this is in fact the unique equilibrium while in the last it is the unique equilibrium that holds for any value of the discount factor . However, if is su¢ ciently large, there are also e¢ cient equilibria where the high quality is produced. Notice that in all of the ine¢ cient low-quality equilibria the utility obtained by the consumer is zero while all the social surplus is captured by the …rm. In these equilibria, the ine¢ ciency obviously calls for regulation and the fact that the consumer doesn't obtain any gains from trade calls for consumer protection. In the following sections we study the implications of allowing for multiple …rms providing the good.
Duopoly
Consider now the extension of the previous model allowing for two …rms. Let's label the …rms as players 1 and 2, the consumer being player 3:
One-Shot Game
The time structure of the one-shot game G is as follows: in the …rst stage both …rms simultaneously choose a price-quality pair. In the second stage, the consumer observes both prices (but doesn't observe the chosen qualities) and then decides whether to buy or not and from which …rm. Contrary to the monopoly case, here we cannot …nd an equivalent game that may be solved by backward induction. In other words, there is no proper subgame of G and therefore subgame perfection is of no use. Of course, the consumer's decision must be based on the observed prices as well as on the expectations or beliefs he has on the chosen qualities. Let q e i be the quality the consumer expects from …rm i. Since prices are the only information available at the time of the consumer's decision, the consumer can use them to form his expectations, therefore we de…ne beliefs as functions of prices. Following Bester (1998) we can restrict to degenerate expectations since the …rm's quality choices are nonrandom (i.e. we are looking for pure-strategy equilibria), then for any price pair (p 1 ; p 2 ), we have 8i = 1; 2
Let's de…ne a beliefs system q e (:) as the function that assigns to each possible observed price pair (p 1 ; p 2 ), the qualities the consumer expects from each of the two …rms, i.e. q e (:) = (q e 1 (:) ; q e 2 (:)), where q e 1 (:) satis…es (3). The consumer's decision is straightforward given his beliefs system: he just chooses to buy from the …rm that, according to his beliefs, o¤ers him the highest utility (as long as this utility is nonnegative in which case he would prefer not to buy from any …rm). Again, we will assume that the consumer buys whenever there is indi¤erence between buying or not. We also assume that if there is indi¤erence between buying from the two …rms he buys from each with equal probability. Formally, given q e (:) = (q e 1 (:) ; q e 2 (:)) the optimal strategy for the consumer is
As solution concept for the game G we will use that of rational-expectations equilibrium, which explicitly states the consumer's beliefs and requires that they are con…rmed in equilibrium and that all players respond optimally to them. Clearly, in any rational-expectations equilibrium, the consumer must play the strategy given by (4). Therefore we formally de…ne it in terms of the …rms'strategies:
De…nition: A beliefs system q e (:) = (q e 1 (:) ; q e 2 (:)) and a strategy pro…le s = (s 1 ; s 2 ), with s i = (p i ; q i ) for i = 1; 2, constitute a rationalexpectations equilibrium if, 8i = 1; 2 1. s i is optimal given s i and beliefs q e (:)
The …rst condition ensures that s is a Nash equilibrium for given beliefs q e , while the second condition guarantees rational expectations (i.e. beliefs are con…rmed at equilibrium). Additionally, we will restrict to equilibria where the consumer buys the good with equal probability from any of the …rms (otherwise at least one …rm would leave the market).
We now show that in equilibrium both …rms choose low qualities and set prices equal to marginal cost (and the consumer buys from any of them with equal probability) as stated in the following proposition Proposition 1: Let a strategy pro…le s = (s 1 ; s 2 ) and a beliefs system q e (:) = (q e 1 (:) ; q e 2 (:)) constitute a rational-expectations equilibrium. Then
Proof: the formal proof is in the appendix (for the general case with n 2 …rms). But the intuition is very simple: we …rst show that, as in the monopoly case, choosing l is a dominant strategy for each …rm. In fact it is strictly dominant unless the …rm doesn't sell. This means that the only reason should a …rm choose high quality is because it's certain it won't sell which then implies that high quality would never be provided in equilibrium.
Anticipating this, the consumer should have beliefs assigning low quality to both …rms. But then we are in the same situation as in a Bertrand Duopoly with complete information, and therefore the unique equilibrium prices are
Notice that although there is a unique equilibrium outcome -…rms provide low quality and set prices equal to marginal cost, and the consumer buys from any of them with equal probability -there are multiple equilibria (all yielding the same outcome). The reason for this is that our equilibrium concept requires that along the equilibrium path, beliefs should be pessimistic (in the sense that the consumer should expect low quality from both …rms) but it poses no restriction on how beliefs are formed o¤ the equilibrium path. In fact any o¤-equilibrium beliefs are admissible as part of a rational-expectations equi-librium, thus giving rise to multiple equilibria. Some equilibrium re…nements have been proposed (e.g. perfect Bayesian, sequential, trembling-hand perfect, and proper equilibrium) in order to discard untenable beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path, but all of those re…nements will yield the same outcome since, in this case, the equilibrium outcome is unique. However, one may wonder what kind of beliefs could be accepted as tenable o¤ the equilibrium path. The answer to this is imbedded in the fact that low quality is a dominant strategy for any possible price pair: therefore, the consumer should expect low quality upon observing any price pair (and not just equilibrium prices). This leads us to select a unique rational-expectations equilibrium, namely, the one involving pessimistic beliefs for any price pair as stated in the following de…nition
De…nition: in game G we say that the consumer has pessimistic beliefs if for any given price vector p he expects both …rms producing low-quality, i.e. 8 (p 1 ; p 2 ) ; 8i = 1; 2 q e i (p 1 ; p 2 ) = l
The corresponding payo¤s in this unique equilibrium are
As in the monopoly case, this equilibrium is ine¢ cient because of the low quality provided. However, in this case, the price competition between both …rms drives the equilibrium price down to marginal cost so that all the gains from trade go to the consumer. As we shall see, this continues to hold if the game is repeated a …nite number of times. However, with in…nitely repeated interaction, …rms may recapture the consumer's surplus by means of tacit collusion.
Finitely Repeated Interaction
Consider now game G T ( ) for T …nite and where G is the duopoly game of the previous section. For the …nitely repeated game there is a unique equilibrium: the one-shot equilibrium under pessimistic beliefs repeated every period. To see this let's consider the last period. The consumer observes the period-T prices and makes his purchase decision depending on those prices and his period-T beliefs about qualities. Period-T beliefs are now much more complicated than the one-shot game beliefs. This is so, because the consumer has now more information from which to form his beliefs: he knows current Tperiod prices, he knows the prices from all previous periods and, if he bought from …rm i in period t T; he also knows q t i -the quality chosen by …rm i in period t. Therefore, period-T beliefs may depend on all of that information. But no matter how complicated those beliefs may be, exactly the same argument used in the one-shot game shows that, period-T equilibrium beliefs should also be pessimistic and therefore …rms should choose low quality and set T period prices equal to marginal cost. The key reason for this is that period-T choices have no e¤ect in future actions simply because there is no future beyond period T . Therefore, all players should behave in period T exactly as they do in the one-shot game. Since there is a unique equilibrium in the one-shot game (the one with pessimistic beliefs), that must be the predicted equilibrium in period T . Having obtained a unique equilibrium for the last period, the usual unwinding argument follows to obtain the same unique equilibrium played unconditionally in each of the preceding periods. Note that the beliefs supporting this equilibrium are constantly pessimistic in the sense that, for each period t, the consumer expects low quality no matter what the past history of the game has been up to that period. We therefore extend the pessimistic beliefs de…nition to the case of repeated games and state the result just obtained in the following de…nition and proposition.
De…nition: in game G T ( ) the consumer has pessimistic beliefs if, for every period t T; he expects low quality from every …rm, independently of what the history of the game has been up to that period.
Proposition 2: For game G T ( ) the unique rational-expectations equilibrium with tenable beliefs implies 1. The consumer has pessimistic beliefs. 2. In every period t, …rms choose low quality and set prices equal to marginal cost, i.e. 8t T; 8i = 1; 2
The equilibrium intertemporal payo¤s are
The result is ine¢ cient and, as in the one-shot game, all the gains from trade go to the consumer. We turn now to study the in…nitely repeated game.
In…nitely Repeated Interaction
In…nitely repeated interaction allows for a myriad of equilibria arising in game G 1 ( ). In particular, e¢ cient equilibria may be obtained because …rms are able to build and maintain a reputation by providing high quality. Notice that in the …nitely repeated scenario no high-quality reputation could be formed because both …rms have incentives to provide low quality in the last period and then, proceeding with a backward reasoning, …rms provide low quality in each preceding period. The in…nitely repeated game has no last period and therefore allows for building a reputation. Nevertheless, in this paper we are interested in …nding low-quality equilibria that call for consumer protection, since that is the empirical evidence we are aiming at rationalizing. The duopoly cases we have analyzed (one-shot and repeated interaction) have produced ine¢ cient low-quality equilibria where the consumer obtains all the gains from trade: although there is ine¢ ciency there is not too much consumer protection needed so far! In the in…nitely repeated version of the game, playing unconditionally in every period the unique rational-expectations equilibrium of the one-shot game is also a rational-expectations equilibrium of game G 1 ( ) : But all the gains from trade continue to go to the consumer. However, an in…nite horizon allows for tacit collusion where the …rms continue to provide low quality and they capture all the gains from trade. For our purposes, this is the interesting case because it is an ine¢ cient equilibrium that calls for consumer protection. The following proposition provides such an equilibrium. The idea behind it is the standard trigger strategies used in in…nitely repeated games of complete information: by assuming pessimistic beliefs, we may extend that idea to this incomplete information game. Then the pro…le = ( 1 ; 2 ) constitutes a rational-expectations equilibrium under pessimistic beliefs for 1=2 (i.e. provided …rms are su¢ ciently patient)
Proof: the formal proof is in the appendix (for the general oligopoly case) but the idea is a very simple "carrot-stick" argument: …rms start by tacitly colluding in the …rst period (they set, independently, the low quality monopoly price l). In the subsequent periods they continue to collude as long as both …rms have colluded in all the previous periods. This is the "carrot" incentive. In case a …rm deviates in some period t, it triggers an in…nite punishment phase (the "stick") starting in period t + 1, because the other …rm will permanently set its price equal to marginal cost. When considering an unilateral deviation in some period t a …rm must weigh the immediate bene…ts (by setting its price slightly below l it captures all the period-t market) against future losses (future pro…ts are zero since the other …rm will set the price equal to marginal cost forever after). The more a …rm values the future (i.e. for higher values of ) the least likely the unilateral deviation will be pro…table. The key that allows us to use the same argument as in a complete information repeated game (i.e. the trigger strategies) is that under pessimistic beliefs there is no need in considering deviations that involve producing high quality.
This equilibrium is ine¢ cient because the low quality is provided. But now all the gains from trade go to the …rms because of the tacit collusion; the corresponding intertemporal payo¤s are
We have thus obtained an ine¢ cient equilibrium for the in…nitely repeated game that may call for consumer protection.
The duopoly results we have obtained for the three scenarios rely heavily on the consumer having pessimistic beliefs. However, it is interesting to note that while pessimistic beliefs are an assumption for the equilibrium in the in…nitely repeated game, they are a result for the other two: in the one-shot game and the …nitely repeated game equilibria, the consumer must have pessimistic beliefs.
Also notice that only in the in…nite horizon scenario do we obtain a low-quality equilibrium (provided …rms are patient enough), where the consumer looses all his surplus, thus demanding consumer protection that could only be achieved by regulation. A mobile phone contract is indeed an inde…nite repeated game and therefore the in…nite horizon should be the appropriate setting to model the game. In the next section we show that these results continue to hold when allowing for several …rms.
Oligopoly
Consider now game G 1 ( ) with an arbitrary large number of …rms n 2. By using the same arguments as in the duopoly case we obtain the following results which are the counterparts to those obtained for the Duopoly case (in fact the formal proofs in the appendix are for this general oligopoly case). We also restate the de…nitions for this general case.
One-shot game
De…nition: we say that the consumer has pessimistic beliefs if for any given price vector p he expects all …rms producing low-quality, i.e. 8i; 8p = (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n ) q e i (p) = l De…nition: A beliefs system q e = (q e 1 (:) ; q e 2 (:) ; :::; q e n (:)) and a strategy pro…le s = (s 1 ; s 2 ; :::; s n ), where s i = (p i ; q i ) for every i, constitute a rational-expectations equilibrium if, 8i = 1; 2; :::; n 1. s i is optimal given s i and beliefs q e 2. q e i (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n ) = q i Proposition 4: let a strategy pro…le s = (s 1 ; s 2 ; :::; s n ) and beliefs q e = (q e 1 (:) ; q e 2 (:) ; :::; q e n (:)) constitute a rational-expectations equilibrium. Then, 8i = 1; ::; n q i = l and
Proof: see Appendix.
The corresponding payo¤s in this unique equilibrium implying pessimistic beliefs are U = l c l > 0 and 1 = 2 = ::: = n = 0
Finitely Repeated Interaction
Proposition 5: For game G T ( ) the unique rational-expectations equilibrium with tenable beliefs implies 1. The consumer has pessimistic beliefs. 2. In every period t, …rms choose low quality and set prices equal to marginal cost, i.e. 8t T; 8i = 1; 2; :::; n This equilibrium is ine¢ cient because the low quality is provided and all the gains from trade go to the …rms because of the tacit collusion; the corresponding intertemporal payo¤s are
Remark: we have seen that all the results of the duopoly case apply to the general oligopoly case. However, notice an important di¤erence: the minimum discount factor needed to support tacit collusion in the in…nitely repeated game increases with the number of …rms:
This means that the higher the number of …rms, the more patient they need to be in order for the tacit collusion to be an equilibrium. This is so because with a higher number of …rms the immediate relative pro…ts of deviating are higher and the future relative loses are smaller, therefore the deviation is more likely to be pro…table. This implies that, the smaller the number of competing …rms, the more consumer protection is likely to be needed.
Conclusions
There is growing evidence that low-quality customer service prevails in the mobile telecommunications industry. In this paper we provide theoretical support to this observation by using simple game theoretical models where low-quality service levels are part of an equilibrium strategy for the …rms. We also show that the low-quality equilibrium is ine¢ cient (i.e. overall welfare would improve by providing higher quality). We do so for three di¤erent scenarios of the game: one-shot, …nitely repeated and in…nitely repeated. Later we …nd that the ine¢ ciency is due to the demand-side market failure generated by incomplete information, and that the ine¢ ciency may not be solved through repeated interaction or competition. In the in…nitely repeated scenario there are some high-quality equilibria. Nevertheless, the quality level obtained in equilibrium relies on the consumers'expectations. In particular we show that under pessimistic beliefs only the low-quality level may prevail.
Then we analyze the duopoly case. We show that under the same three scenarios described above, we obtain an ine¢ cient equilibrium that entails both …rms choosing the low-quality level. Next, we also consider the oligopoly case. We can show that the low-quality equilibrium continues to hold for a large number of …rms. Again, in the in…nitely repeated scenario, high-quality equilibria are also possible, but not under pessimistic beliefs.
In terms of policy implications, these results are important because they suggest that competition will not necessarily solve the ine¢ ciency and therefore justi…es regulation via consumer protection (for example, by means of imposing minimum quality standars, see Leland 1979) .
Consumer protection regulations are partly in place in some industrialized countries. However, more speci…c rules may be needed in terms of, say, training call center operators, quality standards of call centers, possibilities of accessing supervisors in case of disconformities, and other regulations that are beyond the scope of this paper.
Certain countries have government services that mediate in unsettled customers complaints (SETSI 2012). However, in many cases they are unable to impose …nes or penalties to those who fail to apply the remedies mandated by the mediator, which substantially reduces their e¤ectiveness.
Although our work is motivated by empirical evidence in the mobile telecommunications industry, it applies to the general setting of an experience good with an unobservable quality, and is thus related to the literature on vertical di¤erentiation, adverse selection, and signaling games and reputation.
6 Appendix 6.1 Example: High-quality equilibria for the in…nitely repeated monopoly game.
Consider the stage game G with only one …rm and let W h and W l be the social surpluses associated with providing high and low quality respectively, i.e.
W h = h c h and
So that the variation in social surplus is given by
Let 0 < x < , we will construct a SP N E where in each period the consumer obtains utility x > 0 and the …rm gets pro…ts x = l + x > l . This is a "cooperation" situation in the sense that, if both players stick to the strategy pro…le, they will receive, in each period t, a higher payo¤ than the one obtained in the unique one-shot equilibrium. As is usually the case with in…nitely repeated games, we do so by constructing a trigger strategy pro…le where both players earn the cooperation payo¤ as long as they stick to the strategy pro…le. In order to enforce this result, there must be a credible punishment in case some player deviates from the cooperation pro…le, and we do so by permanently punishing them (if there's deviation) with the unique oneperiod equilibrium (which is credible because it is a SP N E). That is exactly what the following pro…le does:
Consider the strategy pro…le = ( 1 ; 2 ) where
If both players follow their strategy, they obtain the following intertemporal
Clearly the consumer has no pro…table deviation in any period. However at any period t the …rm could obtain some extra pro…ts in that period by providing low quality but sacri…cing future payo¤s by triggering the punishment: if he deviates at t = 1, by maintaining the price but cutting quality he will obtain the following
The deviation is not pro…table as long as (5) is higher than (6), i.e.
Solving for in the above inequality we obtain
Hence, as long as the discount factor satis…es (7), the pro…le ( 1 ; 2 ) constitutes a SP N E of G 1 ( ) yielding the stated per-period payo¤s.
Proof of Propositions 1 and 4
Let a strategy pro…le s = (s 1 ; s 2 ; :::; s n ) and beliefs q e = (q e 1 (:) ; q e 2 (:) ; :::; q e n (:)) constitute a rational-expectations equilibrium. Then 8i = 1; ::; n q i = l and p i = c l Proof: the following three Lemmas establish the proof.
Lemma 1: choosing quality l is a dominant strategy for each …rm i Proof: let q e be any beliefs system for the consumer, s i = (p i ; q i ) be any strategy pro…le for all other …rms except i; and p i be any price chosen by …rm i:We will show that
i.e. choosing low quality dominates high quality. Having observed prices (p i ; p i ), the consumer makes his purchase decision according to his beliefs q e . In terms of …rm i, this purchase decision falls into basically three case types: 1. The consumer doesn't buy from i, in which case choosing high or low quality yield the same payo¤ (since the true quality chosen by …rm i doesn't a¤ect the consumer's purchase decision):
2. The consumer buys only from …rm i, in which case choosing low quality yields a strictly higher payo¤ (since the true quality chosen by …rm i doesn't a¤ect the consumer's purchase decision)
3. The consumer is equally likely to buy from …rm i and m more …rms, in which case choosing low quality yields a strictly higher payo¤ (since the true quality chosen by …rm i doesn't a¤ect the consumer's purchase decision):
Therefore choosing l is a dominant strategy.
Note from the three cases in the previous Lemma that the only case where a …rm should choose high quality is if it were certain that it wouldn't sell. But then, why bother to choose high quality if it knows it is not going to sell? Therefore we can conclude that the …rm will never optimally choose high quality. This proves the following lemma:
Lemma 2: Let (s ; q e ) be a rational-expectations equilibrium, then 8i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng q i = l
Finally we show that in equilibrium all prices must equal marginal cost. This should not be surprising since now the game resembles a Bertrand game: players should anticipate low quality to be produced in equilibrium so that incomplete information vanishes resulting in a price competition game. Lemma 3 proves this.
Lemma 3: Let (s ; q e ) be a rational-expectations equilibrium, then 8i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng p i = c l Proof: by Lemma 2; the consumer should anticipate all …rms choosing low quality. Therefore the consumer's optimal decision should be to buy from the …rm o¤ering the lowest price p i as long as l p i 0 All …rms should then set the same price in equilibrium (otherwise some …rms would not sell). Clearly, it is not optimal for …rms to set prices below marginal cost (since they would get negative pro…ts). If all prices are above marginal cost any …rm would …nd it pro…table to unilaterally deviate by setting a slightly smaller price (just as in a regular Bertrand game), therefore, in equilibrium, we must have 8i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng p i = c l
Proof of Propositions 3 and 6
In game G 1 ( ) for the oligopoly case with n 2 …rms, consider the following strategy for each …rm i 
Suppose all …rms except i stick to strategy pro…le i and let 0 i be the best possible unilateral deviation for …rm i: Since the future is discounted by factor , that deviation should occur at time t = 1. There is no need in considering deviations that involve producing high quality because since the consumer has pessimistic beliefs, those kind of deviations could never be the best possible deviation. So let's consider only deviations in the price set. All the other …rms are setting their prices equal to l: by slightly lowering its price, …rm i would get all the market in period 1 (thus obtaining immediate pro…ts of at most l c l ) but it triggers the punishment phase starting in period t = 2 and therefore will earn zero pro…ts in all subsequent periods (since, starting in t = 2; all other …rms will set prices equal to marginal cost on a permanent basis). Therefore the intertemporal payo¤ of the best possible deviation is at most 
